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Mechanism design
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#	Item
141	Learning About The Future and Dynamic E¢ ciency Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu1We Add to Reading List Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il Language: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:06 Mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Economics Principalagent problem
142	Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu Language: English Game theory Mechanism design Distributed algorithmic mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Strategyproofness Revelation principle Vickrey auction Agent-based model Incentive compatibility Algorithm VickreyClarkeGroves auction Multi-agent system
143	A Truthful-in-expectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler Department of Informatics, TU München, Munich, Germany , Add to Reading List Source URL: dss.in.tum.de Language: English - Date: 2015-07-06 06:27:57 Game theory Convex optimization Linear programming Operations research Mechanism design Expected value VickreyClarkeGroves auction Submodular set function
144	Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003 Add to Reading List Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu Language: English - Date: 2009-11-30 14:32:04 Game theory Mechanism design Strategyproofness VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Double auction Incentive compatibility VickreyClarkeGroves auction Algorithmic mechanism design Network formation Mathematical optimization
145	Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable Add to Reading List Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de Language: English - Date: 2011-01-21 03:44:57 Game theory Auction theory Mechanism design Auctions Social choice theory Auction Double auction Bayesian-optimal pricing
146	Is Efficiency Expensive? Tim Roughgarden ∗ † Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2007-05-10 18:02:29 Auction theory Mechanism design Auctions Game theory Sampling Vickrey auction Revenue equivalence Auction Sponsored search auction Virtual valuation English auction Uniform distribution
147	Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Sampling Bayesian-optimal mechanism Prior-free mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Prior-independent mechanism Virtual valuation Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction
148	Combinatorial Agency with Audits Stefan Schmid Chair for Efficient Algorithms Computer Science Department TU Munich, Germany Add to Reading List Source URL: disco.ethz.ch Language: English - Date: 2014-09-26 08:36:31 Algebraic geometry Field theory Valuation Mechanism design Principalagent problem Constructible universe
149	In Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), ppAchieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges David C. Parkes Add to Reading List Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu Language: English - Date: 2010-03-16 10:11:46 Game theory Auction theory Auctions Mechanism design Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction Double auction Discounting Strategyproofness Payment VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
150	Locally robust implementation and its limits Philippe Jehiely, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehnz, Benny Moldovanux March 12, 2012 Abstract We study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that the planner Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17 Game theory Mechanism design Social choice theory Envelope theorem Monotonicity Integrability conditions for differential systems

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